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Abstract 
 
CEECs are characterised by a significant presence of foreign banks and by a marked dependence upon 
financing from foreign bankers. We show that this situation leaves these countries open to two types 
of financial risk, which have grown throughout the present decade. The first relates to the direct finan-
cial exposure between European creditor countries and CEECs and the risk of sudden withdrawal of 
capital. The second, which is indirect, is associated with the risk of regional contagion via spill-over 
effects and the common creditor channel. Based on a synthetic measure of these risks, we show that 
the degree of vulnerability of each country to the recent financial crisis could have been anticipated. 
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Introduction 
 
 Since the 1990s, mass privatizations in CEECs1 have resulted in foreign capital taking a hold 
of whole sections of business activities, particularly the banking sector. On average, foreign banks 
have a concentrated hold on three-quarters of CEEC banking assets (versus 19% for euro zone coun-
tries and 23.8% for the European Union as a whole). The share held by foreign banks is even in excess 
of 80% in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania, and above 90% in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slo-
vakia. This significant presence has been accompanied by growing financial integration between 
CEECs and Western Europe, and by growing dependence on financing from foreign banks. In all 
countries, the latter accounted for over 70% of GDP in 20092.  
In relation to a given country, foreign banks operate either on a cross-border basis, or by open-
ing subsidiaries in host countries. These are either newly created establishments (greenfield banks) or 
the result of acquiring local banks (take-over banks). Foreign bank claims, to use BIS terminology, are 
composed as follows: cross-border claims, i.e. claims of foreign banks from their home country on 
                                                            
* Professor, Department of Economics, Larefi, Bordeaux University, Av. Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac Cedex, 
France. brana@u-bordeaux4.fr 
** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Larefi, Bordeaux University, Av. Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac 
Cedex, France. lahet@u-bordeaux4.fr. Corresponding author: Phone: +33556842903. Fax: +33556848572. 
1 Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Repub-
lic, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
2 BIS banking statistics report total foreign bank claims of BIS reporting banks on a given country. These are 
claims in all currencies, on a host country, of foreign banks and their offices operating locally (subsidiaries, 
branches, joint-ventures). 
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agents in the borrowing country, usually in foreign currency; plus, claims of the subsidiaries of foreign 
banks operating in the host country on resident agents, called local claims, either in local or foreign 
currency. The growing presence of foreign banks in CEECs has increased the share of local claims, 
but cross-border claims are still significant (44% of foreign bank claims in 2009, on average, for the 
10 CEECs).  
Literature has evidenced several advantages linked to the opening up of local markets to com-
petition from foreign banks. The implantation of foreign banks, amongst other things, enables host 
countries to benefit from transfers of skills, technology, human capital and networks, thereby enhanc-
ing the efficiency and quality of bank intermediation (Claessens and al., 2001; Maechler and al., 
2009). The presence of foreign banks then augments the banking system’s credit supply capacity 
(Haselman, 2006; de Haas et Van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010). As opposed to domestic banks, foreign banks 
are seemingly not restricted by the raising of domestic deposits needed to self-finance, because they 
can borrow from the parent bank or utilise the reputation of the parent bank to borrow from other 
banks (Levine, 1996; Agénor, 2003; Aydin, 2008). This is how they seem to have helped finance the 
vigorous growth posted by CEECs in the 2000s and the dynamic of the catch-up process. The large 
hike in bank credit reflects in part a normal phenomenon of economic and financial catch-up to reach 
European standards (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005). It may have, however, appeared excessive in many 
CEECs (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005; Coricelli and al., 2006; Tamirisa and Igan, 2008), verging on the 
expected maximum when based on economic fundamentals (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia) 
and even overrunning (Latvia). This excess may imply over-indebtedness of agents (particularly 
households) but also excessive recourse to foreign financing. Very few studies have shown any real 
interest in this CEEC dependence on financing from foreign banks (Arvai et al., 2009; Aydin, 2008; 
Gersl, 2007; Maechler et al., 2009). This is the aim of this article. What are the risks and the vulner-
abilities associated with the dependence of CEECs on foreign banks and their financing? So far, in the 
literature, the presence of foreign banks has been studied more through a stabilising factor on the sup-
ply of domestic credit, given that they seem to be less sensitive to the host country’s economic condi-
tions than local banks (Haselman, 2006; de Haas et Van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010; Arena et al., 2007). 
The risks linked to the financial external dependences have not been accurately studied.  
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 highlighted the risks linked to financial interdepend-
ence, particularly in the case of emerging countries, the risk of the “sudden stop” phenomenon or a 
reversal in external financing from foreign banks in a context of tighter restrictions affecting the li-
quidity and solvability of international banks and among others parent banks in the home country. 
Some studies have shown that global banks played a significant role in transmitting the 2008-2009 
financial crisis to emerging markets (see for example Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010). However, the 
contraction of foreign banks’ loans was different in different countries. For Kamil and Rai (2010), the 
propagation of the global credit crunch was lower in countries with more foreign loans in local cur-
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rency and more via local subsidiaries. The degree of risk exposure for the withdrawal of foreign bank 
financing deserves to be precisely apprehended. What are these risks concerning the CEECs? Are they 
all exposed to the same risks? Have the most vulnerable countries to financial external dependence had 
been the most affected by the crisis, the capital flow reversals and the following recession?  
In actual fact, CEECs are prone to two types of risk. Firstly, the size of foreign bank claims 
exposes them to the direct risk of capital withdrawals and credit crunch by foreign banks or their sub-
sidiaries. This risk is incremental with regards not only the amount of claims but also their structure. 
CEECs are then faced with indirect financial risks, owing to regional interdependence and inter-bank 
relations. One country might be affected by a crisis that triggers in another, i.e. suffer from quasi-
simultaneous withdrawals of capital or a fall in the credit supply to residents because the two countries 
depend upon the same creditor. If debtor countries belong to the same region, the risk is that of re-
gional contagion. And the contagion may also rely on links between parent banks and subsidiaries.   
In relation to the traditional issues in literature raised over the stabilising role of foreign banks 
operating in CEECs, our article focuses on the financial risks run by CEECs. We look first of all at the 
direct risk involved with the sudden withdrawal of capital (1), then at the indirect risk of regional con-
tagion with the construction of a concentration index (2). After that, we rank countries in accordance 
with their total financial exposure through the construction of a synthetic measure of risk (3). Finally, 
based on this synthetic indicator of risk, we conclude that the vulnerability of the different countries to 
the recent financial crisis could have been anticipated (4). 
 
1. The risk of a sudden withdrawal of capital  
 
With their dependence on foreign financing, CEECs run the risk of capital withdrawal, which 
is funding risk. This risk grows with regards, on the one hand, the size and extent of foreign claims, 
and on the other the structure of this financing.  
The heavy inflows of capital since the early 2000s have led to an accumulation of foreign li-
abilities in the region. Foreign bank claims, as measured by the BIS, appear particularly high – in per-
centage of GDP – in the Baltic States, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Table 1). These 
foreign claims are often associated with record current account deficits3 that were easy to finance in 
times of surplus liquidity worldwide and when there was an appetite for risk. Usually, they are also 
associated with a financing shortfall or funding gap.  
 
 
                                                            
3 Fitch (2008) reckons that 7 of the 8 highest deficits with the 105 emerging countries studied in 2007 come 
down to countries in transition, and that the 2-figure deficits in percentage of GDP reached by these countries are 
most unusual. The current account deficit thus represents 25% of GDP in Latvia, 19.5% for Bulgaria, 16% for 
Estonia, 13.7% for Lithuania and 14% for Romania.  
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Table 1. Foreign bank claims and funding gap (2008) 
 
 Foreign bank claims (%GDP) Domestic credit/domestic deposits (%) 
Bulgaria 87.9 94.4 
Czech Republic 99.3 67.0 
Estonia 174.7 154.2 
Latvia 416.5 130.4 
Lithuania 100.5 138.1 
Hungary 98.2 120.9 
Poland 57.4 85.6 
Romania 72.6 102.2 
Slovenia 80.3 120.7 
Slovakia 107.8 81.7 
Sources: BIS data and Bankscope data, as calculated by the authors. 
 
These foreign loans have helped to finance the growing demand for domestic credit. The 
countries that have most accumulated foreign claims are the countries which have recorded the highest 
rise in domestic credit and have the highest level of debt. Thus, the ratio between domestic credit to 
private sector and GDP is the highest in Latvia (85%), ahead of Estonia (83%) and Slovakia (70%), 
three countries which also post the highest foreign debt. Then, with domestic debt levels of between 
40 and 50%, we find Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, in that order. Inversely, 
Poland, which appears to be the country that is the least dependent upon foreign financing, has re-
corded the lowest growth in domestic credit and has the lowest rate of internal indebtedness in its pri-
vate sector.  
In many countries, particularly the Baltic States, Romania and Hungary, the banking systems 
are reporting a sharp shortfall in deposits compared with the loans they have been granted (Table 1, 
column 2), the difference being financed by inflows of capital. In the Baltic States, on average and 
between 2003 and 2008, the part of foreign bank financing in liabilities represented from 50% to 90% 
of distributed credit. This figure is 40% in Romania and 30% in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary. The 
following graph (Graph 1) shows that there is a strong correlation between the share of foreign bank 
loans (bopfl)4 in percentage of GDP and the size of the funding gap, measured by the ratio between 
credit and bank deposits.  
 
                                                            
4 IMF balance of payments data. 
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Graph 1. Correlation between foreign bank financing and funding gap.  
Slovakia
Slovenia
Romania
Poland
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
1,5
1,6
0 5 10 15 20
bopbfl%gdp
Lo
an
/D
ep
os
it
Regression of Loan/Deposit by bopbfl%gdp (R²=0,559)
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
0 5 10 15 20
bopbfl%gdp
Lo
an
/D
ep
os
it
Active Model
Conf. interval (Mean 95%) Conf. interval (Obs. 95%)
Sources : authors’ calculations 
 
Through domestic credit, these inflows of foreign capital have financed the high growth seen 
with CEECs throughout the present decade. It is estimated that 25% of the variance in corporate in-
vestment can be explained by the growth in domestic credit, and 40% for household consumption 
(Unicredit Group data, 2008). In countries where inter-bank markets are underdeveloped, only the 
maintaining of access for banks to foreign financing has prevented a total collapse of the credit system 
and helped maintain growth.  
This dependence on foreign bank loans leaves countries exposed to the solvability and liquid-
ity of their banking system and that of parent banks. It exposes CEECs to the risk of financing not 
being renewed and even the risk of a sudden withdrawal of capital. Such dependence on foreign fi-
nancing is all the more risky if it is denominated in foreign currency (exchange risk), is short-term 
(refinancing risk) and is provided by banks that are not operating locally (risk of instability) (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Risks linked to the structure of foreign bank financing (2008) 
 Claims in foreign currency* Short-term claims* Cross-border claims* 
Bulgaria 72.7 37.5 44.0 
Czech Republic 24.5 40.3 26.6 
Estonia 83.7 20.7 57.1 
Latvia 89.6 27.8 41.2 
Lithuania 77.4 28.8 63.8 
Hungary 67.6 18.0 48.0 
Poland 41.8 25.4 22.1 
Romania 66.9 46.2 38.2 
Slovenia 62.0 37.7 55.9 
Slovakia 35.0 28.5 23.7 
* in % of total foreign claims.  
Sources: BIS data, as calculated by the authors. 
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The high share of foreign bank claims is generally associated with a higher share of claims in 
foreign currency, to the detriment of claims in local currency (Table 2, column 1). On average, 60% of 
CEEC claims are denominated in foreign currency, whether cross-border or local. The high share of 
foreign currency claims is linked to the phenomenon of the original sin, which reflects the inability of 
emerging countries to borrow on international capital markets in their own currency (Eichengreen & 
al., 2007). In CEECs, it is reinforced by the presence of foreign banks in local markets. The latter pre-
fer to grant loans in euros, the currency in which they are refinanced by their parent bank. The banking 
sector’s access to foreign financing has also facilitated foreign currency loans to the local economy, 
especially in the Baltic States but also in Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Countries which 
opted for fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate systems in relation to the euro (Bulgaria, Baltic States)5, 
are the countries which have the highest share of claims denominated in foreign currency. In this 
frame, borrowing in foreign currency helps provide a favourable interest rate spread, while the per-
ceived exchange risk is nil as long as the exchange system stays credible. Depreciation or devaluation 
of the local currency could very quickly render the weight of foreign currency claims unsustainable in 
these countries.  
Dependence on foreign financing then leads to a risk of instability with the said financing. 
Firstly, exposure to withdrawal of capital is all the greater in that foreign financing is short-term. Judg-
ing by Table 2 (column 2), we see that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia are par-
ticularly exposed to the risk of loans not being renewed. Garcia Herrero et al. (2007) show, moreover, 
that the split of foreign claims between cross-border and local claims also has an impact on the volatil-
ity of foreign financing. Given that the implantation of subsidiaries comes under FDI and incurs sig-
nificant and irreversible costs, it is only logical that the activity of these subsidiaries be less sensitive 
to shocks, or that parent banks work to maintain normal operations within these institutions. For Peek 
& Rosengren (2000) and De Haas et al. (2004), during periods of financial stress, only cross-border 
claims go down. Furthermore, when the subsidiary’s credit supply (local claims) is in local currency 
(local claims in local currency), the result is additional stability for the economy because supply is 
made on the basis of deposits collected locally and on developed local activity. This also reduces cur-
rency mismatches (Moreno & von Kleist, 2007) and, more generally, for the subsidiary, dependence 
on financial support from the parent bank. The role of the parent bank is thus less of a core issue for 
countries, meaning greater protection from potential shocks (McGuire & Tarachev, 2008).  
In three countries, the share of cross-border claims (Table 2, last column) is greater than that 
of local claims. They are Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia, while the proportion is split more or less 
equally in Hungary. These countries would therefore be more prone to a risk of instability affecting 
                                                            
5 Currency Board systems exist in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania while Latvia has anchored its currency with 
the euro with a fluctuation band of +/-1% in relation to the pivot rate. 
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foreign financing. Inversely, in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, three-quarters of foreign 
claims are local claims and so originate from subsidiaries operating locally.  
Finally, if we look at the direct risks to which CEECs are exposed on account of their depend-
ence on foreign bank financing, five countries look to be particularly vulnerable: the Baltic States, 
Bulgaria and Hungary. Then, but to a lesser extent owing to a lower foreign debt, we find Slovenia 
and Romania.  
 
2. The risk of regional contagion  
 
The second financial risk run by CEECs is an indirect risk of financial contagion, linked to fi-
nancial interdependencies between countries. The contagion financial channel (Van Rijckeghem et al., 
2001; Broner et al., 2004) supposes that countries are linked through their presence in a portfolio of 
loans of a common third-party country. The adjustment of an asset portfolio, owing to a search for 
cash to offset losses suffered after a crisis in an initial country, spreads the rationing and the liquidity 
crisis in another country. A country will thus be all the more exposed to the risk of regional financial 
contagion if there is a common creditor in a region and if it, itself, is dependent upon this creditor (Ar-
vai et al., 2009).  
Many transition countries are exposed to a common creditor6, through cross-border loans 
granted by foreign banks from the home country, but also through the network of subsidiaries of one 
and the same parent bank. The common creditor may therefore be appreciated at the macro-economic 
level (home country) and at the microeconomic level (parent bank and the scope of its subsidiary net-
work). 
The common creditor channel may be appreciated, first of all, at the macro-economic level. 
Four Western European countries are highly exposed in several CEECs, in which they are also signifi-
cant creditors. They are thus likely to play the role of common creditor for these countries. According 
to banking statistics from the BIS, in 2008, Austria alone accounts for more than 30% of total foreign 
claims of BIS reporting banks on the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, and almost one-quarter 
of claims on Hungary and Slovenia. It is therefore a significant creditor for each of these CEECs and 
is common to all five. So the conditions for generating a regional contagion are all there. The same 
goes for the following creditors: Germany, alone, covers 32.6% of all foreign claims on Slovenia, 
22.6% on Hungary, 17.6% on Poland and 12% on Latvia. Sweden holds over 80% of foreign claims 
on Estonia, almost 64% of claims on Lithuania and 55% on Latvia. Lastly, Italy holds 24% of total 
foreign claims on Slovakia and between 16% and 18% of claims on Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and 
Bulgaria. To recap, Austria is centre-stage7 in six CEECs, Belgium in three, Germany in four and Italy 
                                                            
6 Initial definitions and metrics were put forward by Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000) after the Asian crisis.  
7 Over 10% of total foreign claims. 
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in six (cf. Table 6 in the appendix). These countries are therefore significant common creditors, imply-
ing that an economic problem in any one of these countries would spill over significantly and simulta-
neously to several CEECs.  
A country would be all the more affected by a financial contagion if it were a large debtor to 
the lending country in trouble, and also if its foreign claims were concentrated on a small number of 
creditors8. To evaluate the degree of risk linked to the creditors concentration, we have calculated a 
creditor concentration index for each CEECs. It shows how vulnerable a country is if it has one or 
more major foreign creditors. This concentration index (Table 3) is calculated by a Herfindahl index. It 
is reached by adding up the square of the share of each creditor in the total foreign claims on a coun-
try. It shows that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Slovakia, are vulnerable to a withdrawal of financing owing to the concentration of their creditors. 
Consequently, they appear highly exposed to the risk of regional contagion. This situation is explained 
by the strong dependence of their external position on very few creditors, by their significant weight in 
the portfolio of these creditors and by the fact that they share these creditors with other CEECs. In the 
Baltic Countries, Sweden is the major creditor, common to all three debtor states (Estonia, Lithuania 
and Latvia). For the Czech Republic, the major creditors are Austria, Belgium and France with these 
three countries representing three-quarters of received foreign bank claims. Slovenia also concentrates 
two-thirds of received foreign claims granted by three countries, Austria, Germany and Italy. For Slo-
vakia, we see Austria and Italy, ahead of Belgium. 
 
Table 3. Risk of regional contagion (2008): a macro view 
 Concentration of creditors* Major creditors** 
Bulgaria 8.6 Italie, Suisse Autriche 
Czech Republic 20.8 Autriche, Belgique, France 
Estonia 65.3 Suède 
Latvia 32.3 Suède, Allemagne 
Lithuania 41.3 Suède 
Hungary 15.7 Autriche, Allemagne, Italie, Belgique 
Poland 9.8 Allemagne, Italie, Pays-bas 
Romania 16.6 Autriche, France, Italie 
Slovenia 20.4 Allemagne, Autriche, Italie 
Slovakia 21.2 Autriche, Italie, Belgique 
* Concentration of creditors in % of foreign claims, the Herfindahl index (multiplied by 100).  
** Share of claims superior to 10% of foreign claims on a country.  
Sources: BIS data and Bankscope data, as calculated by the authors. 
 
 This exposure to the risk of regional contagion is also apparent at the microeconomic level and 
with the parent bank/subsidiaries network. Arvai et al. (2009) present different channels of regional 
contagion that may be exerted via inter-bank links and parent bank/ subsidiaries relationships. Via a 
                                                            
8 Cf. Table 7 in the appendix for details per country.  
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first channel, the problems of cash or solvability experienced by a subsidiary will affect its parent 
company, which has a backlash on its other subsidiaries in other host countries via the common credi-
tor channel. The parent banks of other banks operating in the host countries of the subsidiaries con-
cerned will be affected in turn. A variant of this channel may also involve a subsidiary with which a 
parent company wishes to reduce its exposure for reasons of portfolio diversification. This translates 
to withdrawals of deposits or to a rise in the cost of financing this subsidiary, which may engender 
problems of liquidity and affect, by way of the monetary market, the other banks in the host country 
plus their respective parent banks and the markets in which they do business. Lastly, through an ulti-
mate channel, the parent company’s problems of liquidity or solvability will affect its subsidiaries, an 
ill that will spread, via inter-bank links or through distrust in the banking system, to the other banks in 
the host country and, in return, impact their respective parent companies. In fact, the internal capital 
market with banking groups allows the parent company to arbitrate between subsidiaries. The parent 
bank can modify the composition of its investment portfolio depending on the condition of the host 
country and on expected yields (substitution effect), and not only support the most fragile subsidiaries 
(support effect) (De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2010); Cetorelli & Goldberg (2010)). 
 So, the common creditor channel passes through the parent bank and its subsidiary network. 
The majority of major banking groups in the European Union are active in Eastern Europe, and a 
dozen have opened a subsidiary network in at least three CEECs (Table 4). Their exposure may be 
evaluated in absolute terms (assets held in the region in €billions) or relative terms (share of assets 
held in the region in percentage of the group’s total assets).  Six Western European groups concentrate 
the greatest exposure in CEECs, in excess of €30 billion in 2007 (UniCredit, Erste, Raiffeisen, KBC, 
Société Générale, Intesa Sanpaolo).  
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Table 4. Market share (%) of foreign banks with the greatest presence in CEECs and the national rank-
ing of the subsidiary (2008) 
 Bulgaria CZ Estonia Latvia Lituania Hung. Poland Roumania Slovenia Slovak. 
UniCredit 
(Italie) 
20.3 
(1) 
8.3 
(4) 
 
(9) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
6.3 
(7) 
20.6 
(2) 
6.7 
(6) 
9 
(4) 
8.8 
(5) 
Raiffezen 
RZB 
(Autriche) 
10.4 
(4) 
3.7 
(5) 
   8.3 
(6) 
3.6 
(10) 
7.9 
(3) 
2.8 
(11) 
16.5 
(3) 
Erste Bank 
(Autriche) 
 23.3 
(2) 
   8.5 
(5) 
 26.2 
(1) 
 23.3 
(1) 
KBC 
(Belgique) 
3.4 
(7) 
23.9 
(1) 
   9.8 
(2) 
4.5 
(8) 
 38.5 * 
(1) 
11.6 
(4) 
Société 
Générale 
(France) 
3.3 
(8) 
19.1 
(3) 
     16.6 
(2) 
6.7 
(5) 
2.3 
(12) 
Intesa 
Sanpaolo 
(Italie) 
     9.2 
(4) 
 2.2 
(14) 
5.6 
(6) 
18.5 
(2) 
Swedbank 
(Suède) 
  70.1 
(1) 
26.4 
(1) 
27.7 
(2) 
     
SEB 
(Suède) 
2.8  21 
(2) 
17.9 
(2) 
30.8 
(1) 
     
 
For market shares, total assets of foreign subsidiary in the host country in percentage of the total assets of the 
host country’s banking system, as calculated by the authors using Bankscope data. The national ranking of the 
subsidiary is given in parentheses.  
*However, KBC has only a minority stake (30%) in the largest bank in Slovenia. 
Sources : Bankscope Data, Banks reports, authors’ calculations 
 
Austrian banks appear to have the greatest exposure in CEECs. Erste Bank operates in 16 Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe countries (out of 25) and the region represents 54% of the group’s assets. Raif-
feisen operates in 5 countries, i.e. 39% of the group’s assets. This data reflects a deliberate regional 
strategy on the part of Austrian banks and makes them potential players in any future contagion. We 
then find the Unicredit (Italy) and KBC (Belgium) groups operating respectively in 19 and 12 coun-
tries with significant presence in absolute terms (€140 and €60 billion respectively) but lower when 
seen in relative terms (respectively 12% and 20% of assets). Then come Société Générale and Intesa 
Sanpaolo with exposure representing respectively 5.9% and 6.6% of their assets. Finally, Swedish 
banks are averagely exposed (21% of Swedish GDP: concerning Swedbank, exposure in real value of 
€35 billion in CEECs, i.e. 16% of assets), but this exposure is concentrated on a single area, the three 
Baltic Countries (around 15% of GDP).  
We see this hierarchy of Western European banks when studying market shares in different 
host countries (Table 4). Erste Bank, Unicredit and KBC often hold market shares in excess of 20% 
and generally speaking their subsidiaries are ranked amongst the top 5 banks in local banking systems. 
Swedish banks also hold market shares of over 20% in the three Baltic States, going as high as 70% 
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for Swedbank in Estonia. Ultimately, these high market shares reveal the dependence of CEEC bank-
ing systems on financing from subsidiaries of a smallish number of parent companies. 
 
Table 5. Risk of regional contagion (2008): a micro view 
 % of parent banks* 
Market share held by foreign banks 
(total) 
Bulgaria 40.2 81.6 
Czech Republic 78.3 91.5 
Estonia 91.1 98.8 
Latvia 44.3 62.5 
Lithuania 58.5 83.7 
Hungary 42.1 57.4 
Poland 28.7 70.5 
Romania 59.6 82.1 
Slovenia 24.1** 28.5 
Slovakia 81 95.9 
 
* Parent banks: Share of banking assets (the 20 biggest banks in the host country) belonging to the 8 largest 
parent banks, %. ** Without KBC participation. 
Sources: BIS data, Bankscope data, ECB data, as calculated by the authors 
 
Calculation of the market share held by the eight biggest parent banks (Table 5) shows that 
exposure to regional contagion is particularly high in three countries (Estonia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia). In these countries, major Western European groups account for over 75% of banking assets. 
It is also high in the Baltic Countries, very much dependent on two creditors (Swedbank and Seb). 
Furthermore, in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia, the presence of foreign banks is particu-
larly concentrated on a few banks: the eight largest parent companies account for more than 80% of 
the total foreign bank market in the local banking system. This is not the case in Poland, where the 
market share held by the big eight is 28.7%, compared to that of all foreign banks which stands at 
70.5%. In Slovenia, international banking groups have a stake in seven out of the ten largest banks if 
we include the minority stake of KBC in the largest bank in Slovenia (30%), which represents a total 
of 62,6% of banking assets (24,1% without KBC). 
This exposure to just a few creditors, particularly for the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slova-
kia, illustrates the vulnerability of these countries to the state of relations between parent banks and 
subsidiaries. Given the importance of the parent banks on the international financial stage and their 
significant presence in several CEECs via associated subsidiary networks, these three countries do 
seem particularly vulnerable to the risk of indirect contagion. Belonging to the same parent company 
and relations between subsidiaries appear to be significant links in the spill-over of shocks. Yet, some 
of these countries, for instance the Czech Republic or Slovakia, seem to be rather well protected from 
risks arising from direct creditor/debtor exposure in terms of amounts and of the currency denomina-
tion of their claims.  
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3. Ranking of countries according to a synthetic measure of the different financial risks  
 
Through a principal component analysis, we are able to take account of the different risk fac-
tors associated with foreign bank financing in CEECs (Graph 2) and consequently rank countries in 
relation to these risks. 
 
Graph 2. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 2008. 
Variables (axes F1 et F2 : 71,25 %)
Foreign-owned 
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Local cl.
Local in local
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foreign banking 
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foreign lenders
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Funding gap
Foreign claims
-1
-0,75
-0,5
-0,25
0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
-1 -0,75 -0,5 -0,25 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1
F1 (51,67 %)
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Foreign owned banks: % of domestic banking system assets with foreign capital  
Exposure to foreign banking groups: market share of the biggest banking groups  
Exposure to foreign lenders: the Herfindahl index for the concentration of foreign creditors  
Foreign claims: total foreign claims, from home country and through locally operating subsidiaries (% GDP)  
Cross border: cross-border claims of foreign banks from the home country and in foreign currency (% foreign 
claims) 
International claims: foreign currency claims of foreign banks = cross-border claims + local claims by the located 
subsidiaries in foreign currency on a country (% foreign claims) 
Local claims: claims of subsidiaries operating locally (% foreign claims) 
Local in local: claims of subsidiaries operating locally in local currency (% foreign claims) 
Short term claims: short-term claims of foreign banks (% foreign claims) 
Funding gap: ratio between domestic credit/domestic deposits (%) 
Sources: authors’ calculations on ECB, BIS, IMF data 
 
The horizontal axis opposes, on the left, countries where foreign bank claims are primarily in 
the form of local claims, these local claims being accompanied by financing mostly in local currency, 
with countries where foreign bank financing is mostly cross-border. They are associated with a larger 
funding gap and more financing (foreign and local) in foreign currency.  
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The vertical axis opposes countries marked by a significant presence of foreign banks operat-
ing in the host market and a significant presence of major Western European banking groups, with 
countries where there are more domestic banks or a lower concentration of foreign ownership. 
The different risks to which CEECs are subjected owing to their dependence on Western 
European banks through cross-border claims and the activity of subsidiaries operating locally make it 
possible to identify four groups of countries (Graph 3).   
 
Graph 3. Split of countries, 2008. 
Observations (axes F1 et F2 : 71,25 %)
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Sources: authors’ calculations 
 
First of all, Estonia appears to be the country the most prone to both direct and indirect finan-
cial risks. These risks are linked as much to the size of foreign claims as to the extreme concentration 
of creditors. Six countries then appear vulnerable on account of their direct financial exposure: Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Hungary. More precisely, these countries are particularly 
highly exposed to exchange rate risk owing to imbalances in terms of currency9. In this group, Slove-
nia appears somewhat apart from the rest owing to the relatively small-scale implantation of foreign 
banks in its host market. The third group of countries comprises the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
which appear prone to indirect risks and rather better protected against direct risks. Analysis of bank-
ing interdependence shows that these countries, apparently less exposed owing to the accumulation of 
foreign claims in foreign currency, are not protected from banking-related problems. Despite solid 
fundamentals, they may be affected by the phenomena of regional contagion. More than three-quarters 
                                                            
9 The risk of a twin crisis was latent in 2008-2009 (case of Latvia in June 2009). 
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of these countries’ banking assets (78.3 and 81% respectively) are in the hands of major European 
banking groups, a fact that leaves them exposed to problems with parent banks or with the other sub-
sidiaries of these parent banks. Finally, Poland10 seems to be comparatively less exposed to foreign 
financial risks, whatever the indicators used. 
We have constructed a synthetic risk indicator measuring total exposure (direct and indirect) 
to foreign lenders. To this end, we have added up the coordinates of each country on the f1 and f2 
axes. The higher is the factor score, the riskier is the country. We have compared this risk indicator 
with the actual reduction of foreign claims by international banks during the financial crisis of 2008-
2009 (change between 2008 June and 2009 December). Have the most vulnerable countries to the risk 
measure had been the most hit by the crisis? 
 
Graph 4. Correlation between aggregate financial risk and reduction of foreign banks lending 
during the 2008 financial crisis 
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We observe a strong negative correlation between these two measurements (Graph 4). The 
Pearson correlation coefficient is of -.808. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 did not spare Eastern 
European countries, all in the front line owing to their dependence on financing from international 
banks. The countries that were the most vulnerable to the risks described above and aggregated in this 
risk indicator, were actually the countries that were the most affected by the banking flow withdraw-
                                                            
10 Even though, owing to an effect of size, a financial problem in Poland could contribute to the phenomena of 
contagion.  
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als. Not surprisingly, the Baltic States were the worst hit by the drop in foreign bank claims owing to 
their direct exposure to financing from foreign banks. This fall topped 30% in Estonia and Latvia, and 
26% in Lithuania between June 2008 and December 2009. The sharpest drop then affected countries 
that are highly dependent on parent bank/subsidiary networks and whose claims were relatively highly 
concentrated on a few common creditors. For instance, Slovakia saw its foreign bank financing fall by 
19%, the figure for the Czech Republic was 14%. These two countries clearly illustrate the advantage 
of apprehending financial risks, not only in terms of total outside exposure but also through the effects 
of contagion, which implies apprehending common creditors and the network effects. Finally, Poland, 
a country that is little exposed to financial risks, whether direct or indirect, is one of the least affected 
countries (-7%).  
In addition, the ranking of countries that emerges from our work is also to be found in the 
ECB study (2010)11 focusing on the consequences of the financial crisis for real activity (GDP decline, 
Q4 2008-Q3 2009). Poland comes out on top (+1,5%), the Baltic States are the worst affected (Estonia 
-13%; Latvia -16%; Lithuania -12%), while Bulgaria (-2,5%), the Czech Republic (-3%), Romania (-
4,5%) and Hungary (-5%) are in an intermediary position even though there are differences between 
them.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we show that it is important to assess the risks associated with the entry of 
foreign banks in emerging countries, particularly in CEECs. This presence has an impact on capital 
flows, particularly banking foreign claims, but also on the structure of local funding. A risk assessment 
must take into account the structure of external and local financing (local vs foreign currency, foreign 
claims maturity, cross border claims vs local claims by the located subsidiaries). It must also address 
the dependence on one or very few creditors (concentration index), and evaluate systemic risk, through 
major banking groups and the subsidiaries’ network. It was possible, before the crisis, to rank 
countries according to the risks posed by dependence on foreign lenders. We show that this 
classification is correlated with the magnitude of reversals of capital flows during the crisis. So, our 
study highlights firstly that it is important to precisely measure the different types of risks (direct and 
indirect) and secondly that such a synthetic indicator might be a useful early warning indicator of 
capital outflows and financial crisis.  
The presence in a given country of subsidiaries belonging to a vast network may thus amplify 
the shock-waves during a crisis. However, it may also be one of the conditions for economic recovery: 
according to ECB (2010), the Czech Republic was the first country in this region to revert to economic 
growth over the 1st half of 2010. Moreover, foreign claims on CEECs, down sharply between Spring 
                                                            
11 This study does not address the case of Slovenia or Slovakia. 
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2008 and Autumn 2009 owing to foreign banks being hit by problems of liquidity or capital, have 
gradually begun to grow again since the end of 2009. We notice a certain return-to-normal of the eco-
nomic situation in CEECs and of the financial strain on major creditor banks. But the economic and 
financial risks we have described have not disappeared. The quieter context simply makes their pres-
ence less felt.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 6. The significance of the emerging debtor for creditors: creditor outstanding sums with an emerging country in % of creditor outstanding sums for emerging Europe*, 
September 2008 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Italy 
Netherla
nds 
Portugal Spain Sweden 
Switzerla
nd 
UK US 
Slovenia 3.63 1.90 1.93 6.27 3.46 0.55 0.30 0.38 0.005 0.35 0.98 0.48 
Bulgaria 1.98 1.39 2.13 1.27 3.55 0.49 0.02 0.70 0.03 11.26 0.26 0.62 
CZ 21.93 36.57 20.32 5.54 6.87 5.97 0.45 7.29 0.13 1.07 10.47 6.35 
Estonia 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.45 0.19 0.01  0.18 27.98 0.063 0.10 0.052 
Hungary 13.26 13.02 6.45 15.92 12.25 5.00 2.74 2.88 0.30 1.47 7.48 5.79 
Latvia 0.19 0.01 0.20 2.27 0.59 0.007 0.074 0.28 21.59 0.07 0.44 0.12 
Lithuania 0.094 0.05 0.25 1.54 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.07 25.72 0.12 0.07 0.03 
Poland 6.01 17.70 14.19 24.19 22.90 34.23 84.57 39.63 7.69 15.18 0 22.61 
Romania 15.70 0.87 10.64 1.86 6.05 8.76 2.57 1.62 0.14 13.82 0.51 2.43 
Slovakia 11.56 8.92 3.74 1.72 10.10 4.34 0.13 0.48 0.51 0.11 3.63 2.99 
Sources : BIS data, as calculated by the authors. Consolidated banking Statistics on immediate borrower basis. Foreign claims A+L 
 
16 countries declare the position of their banks with regards emerging countries to the BIS. We have chosen not to include Australia, Canada, Ireland or Japan owing to their weak positions or 
the unavailability of data. 
* Emerging Europe covers 20 countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine, and residual 
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Table 7. The significance of the creditor for an emerging country: creditor outstanding sums with the country in % of foreign claims for all creditors on the emerging country - 
September 2008 
 
% Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherla
nds 
Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerla
nd 
UK US 
Emerging 
Europe 
16.75 8.25 9.35 13.27 13.25 7.37 1.05 0.67 6.43 3.53 0.03 3.23 
Slovenia 23.82 6.13 7.07 32.54 17.92 1.60 0.12 0.101 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.61 
Bulgaria 12.82 4.42 7.69 6.52 18.18 1.39 0.009 0.18 0.07 15.38 0.003 0.76 
CZ 31.78 26.09 16.44 6.36 7.88 3.81 0.04 0.42 0.07 0.32 0.02 1.77 
Estonia 0.70 0.30 0.30 2.71 1.14 0.03 0 0.06 80.76 0.10 0 0.08 
Hungary 23.74 11.48 6.45 22.58 17.35 3.93 0.31 0.77 0.20 0.55 0.02 2 
Latvia 1.28 0.04 0.75 12.05 3.13 0.02 0.03 0.08 55.42 0.10 0.01 0.16 
Lithuania 0.60 0.17 0.91 7.907 1.39 0.30 0.12 0.02 63.72 0.17 0.001 0.04 
Poland 5.52 8 7.27 17.58 16.62 13.81 4.89 1.45 2.71 2.94 0 4 
Romania 35.19 0.96 13.31 3.31 10.73 8.63 0.36 0.14 0.12 6.53 0.002 1.05 
Slovakia 35.31 13.42 6.38 4.18 24.42 5.83 0.02 0.06 0.60 0.07 0.02 1.76 
 
Sources : BIS data, as calculated by the authors. Consolidated banking Statistics on immediate borrower basis. Foreign claims A+L 
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